Abstract: Three U.S. geographers analyze the temporal and spatial trends of 17,438 violent events in Russia's North Caucasus region from August 1999 to July 2011, demonstrating as levels of violence rose in neighboring republics. An increasing number of casualties are civilians in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, the three republics that are the focus of the paper. Employing multiple methods of spatial pattern analysis and geographically sensitive regression models, the authors examine the spatial fragmentation of violence from the perspective of rebel groups operating in the three republics. The analysis documents urbanization, strategic location, and physical geographic factors such as elevation and extent of forest cover). Although violence in the North Caucasus region as a whole has declined in absolute terms over the past four years, the authors show how new geographies of violence are developing in the region, underscoring the emergence of republic-based insurgent operations against the various organs of the Russian state. Journal of Economic Literature,
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tion in the republic of Chechnya had ended. The announcement came 10 years after then-President Boris Yel'tsin initiated the operation; in the interim, roughly 25,000 people were killed, 2 Chechnya's capital of Grozny was severely damaged, and an Islamic insurgency spread, bringing violence to other republics of the North Caucasus initially uninvolved in installed leader of Chechnya, reiterated the Kremlin line, stating that "if the anti-terror operation is over that means we have defeated the bandits. We can calmly announce our victory" Like Vladimir Putin's April 2002 declaration of the end of the military phase in Chechnya during a State of the Nation speech, this 2009 pronouncement was premature (Russell, 2005) . Later in April 2009, Doku Umarov, the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, 3 issued his own declaration, reactivating the Riyadus-Salikhin composed of shahids-Arabic for "witness" or, as a religious term, "martyr"-willing to die for the insurgency. In its initial instantiations, the Battalion was responsible for numer- 4 The reconstitution of the Battalion indicated that suicide bombings -cantly changed its character, from an ethno-territorial one focused on Chechnya to an Islamist one, in the process becoming broader in appeal and more diffuse in geographic expression across the region.
2009 bombing of the Nevskiy Express, which runs between the capital and St. Petersburg transit point in the system located under the headquarters of the Federal Security Service (abbreviated FSB [Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti] , the successor to the KGB), was followed 40 minutes later by an explosion at Park Kul'tury, on the circle line that rings the city center. In total, 38 people were killed and 60 were injured. In January 2011, a suicide bombing neighboring republics of the North Caucasus. In the former case, violence has decreased from its high point between 1999 and 2002; 5 this is due, in part, to Russia's policy of Chechenization (turning over security and political operations in the republic to local allies) and the co-optation of the former-rebel Kadyrov clan by the federal authorities to provide a local bulwark against the insurgents (Russell, 2007 (Russell, , 2009 . In other parts of the North Caucasus-most notably Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria-violence has spiked at irregular intervals since 2007, due to Russia's heavy-handed counter-insurgency techniques, entrenched corruption and government ineffectiveness, and a pervasive lack of economic development and In these republics, semi-independent jamaats Russian state) drivers of violence.
We document the course of the insurgency in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and KabardinoBalkaria, with particular emphasis on the past half-decade. Using a data set of 17,438 violent events in the North Caucasus that we collected from the start of the second Chechen war in August 1999 through July 2011, we identify spatial patterns of violence both at the 3 An Islamic state proclaimed by Umarov in October 2007 to succeed the Chechen Republic, which he considered to be illegitimate (see below). In practice, it is an organization that seeks the realization of an Islamic pan-North Caucasian state. 4 For locations mentioned in the text, see violence in the North Caucasus while also engaging with the broader question of how this away from Chechnya between 1999 and 2007. This paper complements the global study of terrorism by Flint and Radil (2009) in this journal by a detailed examination of local dynamics of rebel actions.
We begin the paper by reviewing the security context in the North Caucasus, with a focus on regional developments since the Kremlin's April 2009 declaration of victory, before covering events in the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria in detail. Though we place the study in the context of the academic literature on the disaggregated study of civil war violence (see the recent reviews by Raleigh, 2009 and Raleigh, Witmer, and , our main interest in this paper is the changing nature and location of rebellion in the North Caucasus and its contextual underpinnings, seen through a regional geographic lens.
2011) dataset of disaggregated violent events for the North Caucasus (described below).
Despite an increase in attention to "geography" in civil war research, variations in violence considered at local contexts remain poorly understood. The paper considers longitudinal trends in violence in the North Caucasus, although the empirical emphasis is on the recent diffusion of violence away from Chechnya and into neighboring republics. neighboring republics. Second, an increasing number of casualties-those either injured or killed-are civilians as a result of violence in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
different.
6 Third, and affecting the ratio at which civilians are more often the victims of viorespective republics, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Fourth, we show that the landscapes of violence in different zones (elevation, forests, urban and strategic locations) vary dramatically over the region. To substantiate these arguments, we employ multiple methods of spatial pattern analysis (geographic disaggregations, potential surfaces, and time-series analysis by republic) and geographically sensitive regression models to assess the spatial fragmentation of violence from the perspective of rebel groups operating in the three republics. Our overall argument is that, although violence in the region has continued to decline in absolute terms over the past four years, new geographies of violence are developing in the region, underscoring the emergence of republic-based insurgent operations against the various organs of the Russian state.
CONTEXTUALIZING VIOLENCE AND REGIONAL TRENDS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS REGION
This section of the paper provides contextual background on the three republics-6 Civilians made up a substantial percentage of the total casualties during both Chechen wars. Since 1994, 75,000
regional geography "that is concerned with explanation, not just description" and considers relevant local processes "in relation to developments unfolding both above and below the scale of the region," our contribution gives an updated picture of the violence in the North Caucasus, while also touching on the relevant political and social conditions found there and in Russia more generally. 7 As Sagramoso (2007, p. 683) notes: "despite some major commonalities, the local socio-political, economic and religious conditions vary substantially across the North Caucasian republics." Ware's (2011) recent study outlines how the policy the Kadyrov clan) with the aim of delegating counterinsurgency responsibilities to local units (Russell, 2008) , has been exported to Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria; in these
The insurgency in the North Caucasus has its origins in the renewal of hostilities in Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan in late summer 1999. Though Shamil Basayev carried out an insurgent-style raid on the town of Budennovsk in neighboring Stavropol' Kray late -solidated the shift toward guerrilla engagements against Russian forces as the central tactic of the Chechens' military strategy. During the early years of the second war, Basayev sought to a great deal of autonomy for the republic. As the most committed of the Chechen leaderin the North Caucasus (Kramer, 2004 (Kramer, -2005 , Basayev's tactics led to a different military application of these tactics beyond Chechnya proper: the June 21-22, 2004 raid on Nazran', Ingushetia, which targeted 15 government buildings in the republic's main city and left 88 dead, and the October 13, 2005 action in Nal'chik, Kabardino-Balkaria, which brought the republic's capital to a standstill and resulted in more than 100 deaths, including 14 civilians 9 The insurgency complemented its guerrilla campaign with terrorist operations aimed at Russian citizens and conducted in both the North Caucasus and and Volgodonsk in September 1999, they included the hijacking of two domestic airliners by two female Chechen "black widows" on August 24, 2004; and hostage-takings Taylor (2007) suggests that this lull was the result of a changeover in regional lead-7 For broader coverage of the region's geography, see O'Loughlin et al. (2007) 8 See also King (2011) . 9 The attack on Nal'chik (discussed in more detail below) should be distinguished from Nazran', as it included Southern Federal District (SFD) in the wake of Beslan, and the short-term, ameliorative effect on the federal center's repressive policies. "Chechenization" also resulted in reduced levels of violence, particularly in Chechnya proper (Russell, 2009 This spread of violence from Chechnya is the new reality for the security situation in the North Caucasus. It also calls into question the long-term capability of the strategies thus far employed by the Kremlin in countering the insurgency. Taylor (2007, p. 13) , for example, has criticized the institutional viability of Russia's approach: "the type of state Russia has in the North Caucasus is the kind most likely to provoke revolution: simultaneously repressive, as Ramzan Kadyrov further consolidates his position in the republic and is conceded even greater autonomy by the federal center. Similarly, Ware (2011, p. 507) cautions against the spread of the policies employed in Chechnya to other republics in the North Caucasus: the export of the personalistic leadership model associated with Chechenization "to Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan only seem[s] to provoke militant Islamist reactions." And In partial recognition of the continued violence in the North Caucasus and its diffusion Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) in January 2010 (Ware, 2011). 10 suggested that economics are at the root of the region's problems, indicating an acceptance -potentiary to the SFD between (Slider, 2008 . Alexander Khloponin, who had previously headed the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, was brought in to lead the new federal the heads of federal agencies in the region. Khloponin was also named a deputy prime min--dential envoy. Further, Sakwa (2010, p. 614) suggests that Khloponin's appointment serves 10 The NCFD, which was hived off from the SFD, includes Stavropol' Kray (where the district's administrative capital of Pyatigorsk is located) and six ethnic republics: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, KabardinoBalkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and thus corresponds to our study area in this paper. The truncated SFD is now composed of Rostov, Volgograd, and Astrakhan oblasts, Krasnodar Kray, and the republics of Adygeya and Kalmykiya (see Sukhov, 2010 We now turn to the consideration of insurgent violence in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and -ing consensus that the insurgency in the North Caucasus is best described as a network, similar to other terrorist groups, with local and regional cells waging war against the state in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
11 As Kuchins et al. (2011, p. aim of Islamists of consolidating the Caucasus Emirate across the region should be positioned 11 2011b).
against the reality that these groups, for the most part, operate in delimited areas in response to is thus necessary for an understanding of the local violence landscapes and their dynamics.
Dagestan
Dagestan, the largest of the ethnic republics in the North Caucasus in terms of both land area and population, was thrust into the international spotlight when Shamil Basayev launched his raid from Chechnya into its western border villages in August 1999. Prior to -vative form of religious practice.
12 In 1998, three villages near the center of the republicKaramakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar-declared their independence and adopted a social and legal system based on sharia and Dagestani security forces (Giuliano, 2005) . In June 1996 prior to this declaration, the head of Kadar village had been murdered, purportedly by local fundamentalists who subseKaramakhi attacked a military barracks at Buynaksk, the administrative center of the rayon where the three villages are located. To quote Kisriev and Ware (2000, p. 479) : "there was a fateful inevitability to the military actions in Dagestan."
The August 1999 incursion failed to incite widespread support for the establishment of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus (though some Dagestanis were part of the invading force), as local militias cooperated with republic and federal forces to repel the invaders. Rather, it -tial spike in funding occurring between 1999 and 2000 (Ware and Kisriev, 2010) . During the initial stages of the second war in Chechnya, Dagestan, like other regions in the Russian Federation, revised its constitution to eliminate inconsistencies between this document and the Federal constitution.
13 Throughout the post-1991 period, most people in Dagestan remained of support for either religious or ethnic-based separatism (Ware et al., 2003) .
an increase in terrorist violence in the republic starting in late 2002 (Kisriev and Ware, 2005) . A key driver of violence remains the suppression of Islamic organizations and the mistreatDecember 1999. In turn, Sagramoso (2007, p. 703) reported an uptick in violence between 2004 and 2006, as the "arbitrariness of the police and law enforcement structures impelled many young men into the arms of the extremists." During this period, the Sharia jamaat, headed by Rappani Khalilov, emerged as the key to be a close associate of Shamil Basayev, helped implement a series of terrorist attacks 12 The term "Wahhabism" is commonly used, often in a derogatory manner in Russia for these religious conservatives. For background, see Walker (2005) . 13 Changes included the revision of electoral practices for parliamentary elections and the establishment of the served as the republic's executive under the structure of the 1994 Constitution (Kisriev and Ware, 2005) .
Kaspiysk, which killed 45, and the assassinations of members of the republic's government, including two ministers for national policy, information, and external relations. Khalilov was killed in September 2007, although a new leader of the Sharia jamaat was quickly installed over the past half-decade; while no jamaat leader in Dagestan has survived longer than a year as leader since Khalilov's death, the insurgency remains not only viable but has achieved deaths of the jamaat's leaders have elicited dueling declarations from the jamaat and the Russian government; the former says that the jihad will proceed unabated, while the latter claims success in eliminating a key player in the violence. In general, the deaths of individual militants, even those in leadership positions, have had little impact on the overall strength of the insurgency.
to increased international attention because it followed the twin metro bombings carried out was planted at the Irganay hydroelectric facility, which mirrored an attack earlier in the summer at Baksan in Kabardino-Balkaria (discussed below). This is not to say that insurgents no longer directly engage with Russian forces. In June 2011, a battle between insurgents and security forces in the village of Kuznetskovka, not far from Kizlyar, left 13 military and security troops dead (Jamestown Foundation, 2011) . These events are only a selective sampling response to the increasing violence, the need for further economic development, and continuing concern over the maintenance of ethnic balance in Dagestan's political system (Ware, - was viewed as a compromise choice, who could mediate across varied political and economic interests and use his politi-14 de jure president. Aliyev served a single term and was widely perceived as unwilling to forcefully prosecute the war,
Ingushetia
Dagestan or Kabardino-Balkaria. During the course of the second Chechen war, there of Chechnya, most likely due to historical and cultural continuities between the two groupsthey were united in a single republic during the late Soviet period, both groups were deported to Central Asia by Stalin in 1944, and both were repatriated in the 1950s. Their languages are closely related since both are Vainakh peoples (see Wixman, 1984, pp. 43-44, 82-83) .
Ingushetia, however, should be treated as distinct from Chechnya when considering the republic's security situation in the past decade. A key event in galvanizing resistance to Russia popularly elected president of the republic. Aushev, a former Soviet general who had served in Afghanistan, had effectively countered the Islamist threat in the republic during the 1990s; his policies included the legalization of polygamy and appeals to clan and familial networks differed with the Kremlin and openly criticized how the war in Chechnya was conducted. Following a legal dispute regarding the proper length of his presidential term, he resigned in late 2001. The Kremlin manipulated the election to replace Aushev, ensuring that its preferred lacked legitimacy due to the dubious circumstances surrounding his election. Regarding Ingushetia's refugee population, he was committed to returning the IDPs (internally displaced persons) to Chechnya, in part to support the Russian government's claim that the republic was safe, but despite testimony from returnees that the situation remained unstable due to include corruption, widespread poverty, and a general mistrust of the Russian government due, in part, to the loss of Prigorodnyy Rayon to North Ossetia as a result of the Stalin-era deportation (on the last issue, see . Perhaps most importantly, the zachistki of alienation among large segments of the population. Pain (2005) reports, for example, that
The June 2004 raid on Nazran', Ingushetia's largest city and former capital, should be viewed in this context. Coordinated by Shamil Basayev, the attack began on the night of June 21, 2004, and targeted Ingushetia's interior ministry and other government buildings. According to Fuller (2009) , many of the ethnic Ingush involved in the attack had relatives who were rounded up during zachistki Nazran' raid was indicative of the future direction of the North Caucasus insurgency; conserRussian military and security forces, due primarily to the abusive and extrajudicial tactics adopted by these organs, and the anti-state insurgency has extended its action beyond the borders of Chechnya proper. Though Basayev had previously selected targets in neighboring North Caucasian republics, 15 Nazran' conclusively showed that the insurgency had support in other republics-unlike the case of Dagestan in August 1999. The subsequent emergence of jamaats -ment of such support and the extension of the insurgency's theater of operations.
Following the Nazran' attack, violence in Ingushetia continued to rise, as Russian authorIngushetia, they go generally unreported by the international media; few major events have taken place in the republic, although the school hostage-taking and its violent dénouement in Beslan occurred just beyond Ingushetia's borders in neighboring North Ossetia. That said, our resigned from the presidency-there were 357 violent events, with a subsequent drop-off in the years since, to 309 events in 2009 and 192 events in 2010.
tenure-Ware (2011) estimates that more than 80percent of Ingushetia's population had joined the nonviolent movement to replace him by summer 2008-it was the extrajudicial 16 Rather than reinstate former president Aushev, which was the preference of the opposition, the to a high-level administrative position in Russia's military intelligence. Upon assuming the presidency, Yevkurov adopted a series of populist measures intended to distinguish himself from his predecessor, including meeting with members of the opposition. These conciliatory actions did not prevent him from being targeted by insurgents, as Yevkurov was critically injured during a July 2009 suicide bombing in Nazran'. This attack followed closely on the the republic, and in August 2009, a suicide bombing at the headquarters of the Nazran' police department killed 20 and injured 80.
Overall, Yevkurov's time as Ingushetia's president has resulted in substantive improvements in the republic's security situation. There has been a appreciable drop in violence-in in abductions, the latter approaching an 80 percent decline (The Peaceful Exception, 2011).
2011, information on whose gathering-point was gained in part through collaboration with civilian informants.
Yet concerns remain. Dzutsev (2011b) argues that Yevkurov has done little to address of attack and retaliation, and the continued lack of an open and independent media provide feedback mechanisms for political discontent. Yevkurov's lack of formal control over either the local police or federal security forces limits his ability to temper actions that provoke individuals to join the resistance, such as abduction and torture (The Peaceful, 2011) . And despite his personal courage in the face of the assassination attempt, doubts about Yevkurov's (Yemelianova, 2005) .
The October 13, 2005 attack on Nal'chik occurred in the context of these dual crackdowns. The attack included approximately 150-200 militants drawn primarily from the local population, though it was generally viewed as poorly coordinated- Leahy (2008, p. 13) , for example, has characterized it as an "operational catastrophe." The intended targets included -tion of these casualties were civilians. In its wake, there was further public discontent over 17 -marily between 2002 (Vidino, 2005 . The Russian government accused Georgia of harboring the rebels, suggesting that 200 rebels remained after Georgia received military support from the United States to enhance its counterterrorism response in the Gorge.
[Authors: I assume the "more fundamentalist elements" refers to the new classically trained imams?] the handling of the bodies of casualties, the arrest of Ruslan Nakhushev, a leading intellectual -ecution of 58 suspected participants in the raid is ongoing; many of the accused counter the the youths to forcefully oppose the Russian and republican governments.
Anzor Astemirov, who headed the Yarmuk jamaat during the Nal'chik raid and survived, subsequently emerged as an important component in the ideological structure of the Caucasus Emirate. In 2008 he was appointed qadi, or head of the organization's Sharia court. Astemirov's successes in carrying out rebel actions were relatively few, though there was an uptrend in violence during 2008 and 2009. Asker Jappuyev succeeded to the leadership of the republic's jamaat 2010. Over the next few months, violence increased substantially in Kabardino-Balkaria; of the 111 events recorded in our database during 2010, all but 5 occurred after this leadership transition. The jamaat's new leadership clearly implemented a shift in strategy. Whereas the group had previously targeted security forces, "new insurgency leaders seem to follow a different ideological path by targeting civilians … as well as orchestrating attacks against ecothe Baksan hydroelectric facility, killing two security guards and successfully detonating a series of explosive devices. The attack damaged two of the facility's generators. of the republic's mufti, Anas Pshikhachev, who by the nature of his position was viewed as -nographer who de-emphasized the role of Islam in Circassian national identity. 18 In February 2011, insurgents killed three tourists traveling to the El'brus ski resort, in the south of the republic. These attacks came in the wake of the Kremlin's proposal at the World Economic Forum to develop a series of ski resorts in the North Caucasus by 2020, at a cost of nearly $15 billion. It should be noted that in comparison to Ingushetia and Dagestan, the republic's leadership has been stable; Arsen Kanokov replaced the long-tenured Valery Kokov in September 2005 and has had marginal success in weaning the republic from federal subsidies (Ware, 2011) . The plan to develop ski resorts is viewed by many as unrealistic due to the region's relative geographic isolation (in comparison, for example, to the Alps and Pyrenees) and continued high levels of violence in the region. In the wake of the February 2011 attack, Khloponin suggested a short-term halt to travel to the El'brus resort.
Recent developments in Kabardino-Balkaria have made the situation more uncertain. The jamaat's leadership core-including Asker Jappuyev and Ratmir Shameyev, the young leader of the group's Chegem sector-was killed in late April 2011 during an operation along the border between Kabardino-Balkaria and Stavropol' Kray. In total, eight militants and two women were killed. Fuller (2011) reports that the group was apparently betrayed to local jamaat. The jamaat has previously suffered similar losses, so it is unclear whether this most recent attack will result in a decline in violence.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS, 1999-2011
In this section, we provide a longitudinal overview of the events dataset to establish a 18 The Kabards, along with the Adygey and Cherkess belong to the Circassian peoples (Wixman, 1984, p. 88).
[Authors: Please indicate source for killing of ski tourists en route to El'brus resort] Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The complete dataset contains 17,438 events, collected starting in August 1999 and running through the end of July 2011. The data were gathered from wire reports available through the LexisNexis Academic service. Where reported, locations were coded to the population point's coordinates. If not reported, events were assigned the geographic coordinates of the centroid of the rayon (the Russian equivalent of county) -ulation point or rayon were dropped from our geographical analysis. Latitude and longitude coordinates were obtained either from Falling Rain (www.fallingrain.com) or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GEO-net Names server (http://earth-info.nga.mil/gns/html/). When collecting the data, events were categorized by actor, including rebels, military, and in the wire report.
19 Supplementary information on Chechnya was collected from the reports (in Russian) in the Caucasian Knot (Kavkazskiy Uzel) database. In analyzing the data on violent events, we class military and police events together, as both these actors represent the interests of the Russian government, albeit at different scales-the federal and republic, respectively. Also included in the database is the date of the event, a brief synopsis, and the number of reported casualties (killed and injured) resulting from the event. Beyond genbeyond Chechnya and increasingly targeting civilians, we present three types of analysis to explore the spatial diffusion of violence in the North Caucasus: (a) a surface plot of potential violence; (b) an evaluation of three "classic" arguments from the civil war literature, which considers the proportion of violence in urban areas, the targeting of strategic locations, and the relationship between physical geographic attributes (elevation and forest cover) and the than testing hypothesized relationships about their local causes and distributions that would rebellion. 20 (2011) study. In its most recent country report on terrorism, the U.S. State Department (2011b) wrote that "terrorist attacks in Russia continued to emanate from the ongoing unrest in the later. Overall levels of violence in the region have decreased over the past four years, but the locations of violence are changing and its occurrence is growing in the three republics that are the focus of this paper (Fig. 2) able around Nazran' during the August 2007-July 2011 period. Kabardino-Balkaria, in contrast, has been the site of a substantial diffusion of violence to points previously untouched by in Nal'chik, while during the next four yearS incidence of violence spread gradually towards July 2011, in addition to Nal'chik, the town and rayons of Tyrnyauz, Baksan, and Chegem 
WHO AND WHAT ARE THE INSURGENTS TARGETING?
Our second argument is that civilians-either as bystanders or directly targeted by rebels-are increasingly more likely to be the victims of insurgent attacks; this is particularly both the primary actor and the casualties reported for each violent event, we are able to calculate the impact, in terms of number injured and killed, of attacks by rebels on both civilians and military/police actors. 21 Previous work has suggested that the Islamist insurgency in the three republics primarily targets individuals and infrastructural elements most associated with regional security, due to their association with the federal and local leaderships, but also due to the latter's indiscriminate tactics in countering the insurgency (International Crisis Group, 2008; RFE/RL, 2009) . By comparing the total number of attacks to the number that targeted civilians, 22 target of rebel attacks than civilians (Table 1) .
While the general pattern is unsurprising, by looking at trends over time, we observe a One method for assessing the spatial distribution and concentration of rebel violence is through the compilation of potential surface maps. Potential surface maps are tools designed to summarize visually a spatial distribution using both the distance between points and their respective values. The concept originated in physics to measure the potential, or energy, in a for each location, the potential impact of all surrounding areas on a particular point (Taylor, 21 Those events without casualties were frequently aimed at infrastructure in the region; the sabotage of railway lines, for example, has become a common occurrence throughout the past decade. maps for most regions of the world, the method was widely applied to other measures such of violence exhibits an inverse distance decay (see Appendix 1), these potential surface maps by violence in surrounding areas. For our study, we create violence potential surfaces for rebel events, excluding events whose location can only be geocoded to a republic. To do this, we spatially aggregate the events to a set of uniform grid cells overlaid on the study area. With 292 grid cells for the study area, the 25 km cells are a size selected with an eye toward minimizing intra-cell variation and maximizing inter-cell variation. Figure 4 while Nazran' remains a hotspot, Grozny reemerges as a location for potential violence, along emerging as a secondary node and the diminution of violence in Ingushetia clearly observable. Overall, the patterns in these maps support our proposition that the changing nature of
FACTORS IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF REBEL ACTIONS
We map spatial distributions of violent events according to three criteria that derive from the civil war literature, namely degree of urbanization, the concentration of violence around strategic locations, and physical geography. For each criterion, spatial categories were constructed from multiple sources of geographic data before summing event counts. As we did in evaluating casualties, we are interested in those events in which rebels were designated as literature on the locational factors differentially related to violence.
23
While political scientists have emphasized institutional factors in accounting for the onset and duration of civil war violence (an emphasis criticized in Korf, 2011) , geographers have tended to focus on the regional and local differences in the map of violence. Though political scientists have generally accepted that the landscape of civil war violence is usually highly uneven within a polity, their "geographic" measures are often highly aggregate (general measures of terrain and forest) or simplistic binaries (peripheral versus core locations). Their -gies (mountains and forests offering sanctuaries and hiding places for bases) and the tit-for-tat elements of irregular warfare (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . Recent research that has parsed the found a consistent relationship with the rate of violence (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2009). Fitzpatrick (1977) in his account of the 1916-1922 Irish rebellion by paying close attention to the dramatic differences in the level of mobilization of local populations against the British statistics on the indicators of violence but engaged in a crude analysis of the local correlates of violence using contemporary census measures of socio-economic, agricultural, and industrial employment. Without recourse to the rational actor approach that underpins the Kalyvas (2006) work on the Greek civil war, the conclusions of the Irish studies are quite similar. Within a general model of self-interest (certain locales specialized in economic activities that relied on the British market, and thus would be hurt by a successful independence movement), the role of schools, activists, historical memories of previous uprisings, personal networks, and key organizers-in accounting for the highly variegated map of violence. Similar political and economic factors motivate violence in the North Caucasus, and are loosely connected in opposition to the federal state.
While disaggregation does not necessarily equate to detailed geographic event data, in practice, this has been the main paradigm for breaking civil wars into analytical components. Furthermore, the variables selected for study have been determined both by availability and theoretical interest; they include the "greed" and "creed" measures (income, inequality indi-2009), as well as factors considered to be important in government and rebel strategies (inhospitable terrain including elevation and forest cover, distances to key strategic and urban centers, border and peripheral locations) (Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Rustad et al., 2008) . We will a synthesis of the explanations in a geographically sensitive and integrated model of violence across the entire region.
Urban/Rural Distributions
The degree of urbanization can be divided into four categories (rural, large village, near urban, and urban), representing relative population densities and settlement sizes and allows examination of the widely mooted increased effect of urban location on violence (e.g., Kalyvas, 2008) . Large villages (about 5,000 residents or more) and urban areas (more than -cal purposes (Operational Navigation Chart) at a scale of 1:1,000,000 and so do not include many smaller villages and towns. The data for this portion of Russia were digitized from the Operational Navigation Chart F-04 which was published from 1972 to 1974.
One of the data layers in the DCW is a geographic polygon layer of populated places, irrespective of political boundaries, seen as the large villages and urban areas depicted in Figure 5A . Urban areas (17 in total) were selected by identifying those built-up polygons that corresponded to cities with a census population in 2002 of at least 50,000 people (Perepis, 2002) . The near-urban category was derived from these 17 urban areas by constructing a over time, a trend toward more urban areas for rebel-initiated violence is evident (Fig. 6) . There also appears to be a relationship between increased levels of violence and its distribution among urban and rural zones. At the height of violence in Ingushetia, from August 2008 to July 2009, more than one-third of events took place in zones designated as urban in our -ring in urban areas is 57.2 percent, and 29.5 percent in rural areas). In both republics, events
In Kabardino-Balkaria a similar pattern holds-as violence increases, it concentrates more in cities. Between August 2007 and July 2009, for example, 45.2 percent of events were 2010 and July 2011, the percent rural has decreased substantially to 28.9 percent, while urban share has risen slightly to 40.8 percent (a plurality of the total events). In part, this shift less likely to be found in the mountains than in the cities, with the urban warfare of assas-(2007) has observed that urban areas are frequently the sites of gun battles between militants and Russian forces.
Proximity to Strategic Locations
By examining the yearly number of rebel events near strategic locations, one can evaluinstallations, all with elements of the 58th Army, are located in Budennovsk, Vladikavkaz, Nazran', Stavropol', and Vladikavkaz) as regional centers of power and of Russian administrative institutions are also strategic locations and frequently the targets of major rebel attacks. 25 network in the Digital Chart of the World (ESRI, 2003) . The highway roughly parallels the mountains and connects all the regional capitals, and its central importance to Russian military and local security effectiveness is well documented (Lyall, 2006) . Again, our analysis is focused on Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
fer of 5 km for the highway and 10 km for the military bases and capitals was constructed to 24 -nate system set to zone 38N. This coordinate system divides the globe into 60 vertical zones (each 6° wide), and uses 25 and most strategic city in that republic. capture their possible impact as rebel targets on the geographic distribution of the war. Violent events (excluding events that could only be geocoded to a rayon as well as those geocoded to republic centroids) within any of these buffered regions were counted as near a strategic location, and rebel percentages by year are shown in Figure 7 .
gent attacks were more or less equally divided between strategic and non-strategic targets for Dagestan and Ingushetia. By the end of 2003, a noticeable shift toward strategic locations had occurred, particularly in Dagestan. Since then, the percentage of attacks proximate to the data series. Ingushetia, on the other hand, has seen a more gradual rise in rebel events near strategic locations; of the three republics, such attacks are most common there (at 76.5 percent of total events during the August 2010-July 2011 timeframe), in part due to the conKabardino-Balkaria is an exception to the general pattern, in part because of the infre--fusing within Kabardino-Balkaria, as many of the events that previously took place in or near the capital of Nal'chik have now spread to more remote areas. Overall, this shift in strategy shift in tactics to guerrilla assaults on key installations and prominent persons associated with of the republics as strategic locations.
Elevation/Vegetation Distributions
Though well-debated in the civil war literature, the geographic distribution of mountains more nuanced and disaggregated index than is typically used. The categories aim to capture physical geographic differences that affect human land use and patterns of settlement and thus and land cover data to create four categories: low elevation, mid-elevation with no forest, mid-elevation forested, and high elevation (Fig. 8) . These categories effectively separate the steppe in the northern study area from the hills and mountains of the southern portion. Few forests are found in the steppe region or high mountains, so only the mid-elevation zone differentiates between forests and non-forests.
The elevation data were collected aboard the Space Shuttle Endeavor in February 2000, Global Land Cover Facility (USGS, 2004) . We obtained these digital data at a resolution of three arc seconds (nominal 90 meter pixel resolution) and divided them into three elevation zones (less than 300 meters, 300 m to 1,500 m, and over 1,500 m). Forest data were also -land pixels as forest, since each category has more than 40 percent canopy cover and trees Because there is little variation from year to year, Table 2 presents the aggregated rebel violent events by elevation/vegetation category for two time-periods, by type of event and by republic. In the region as a whole, rebel events occur more often in non-forested midelevations than forested mid-elevations, but in Chechnya, twice as many events occur in forested areas because there is little non-forested mid-elevation terrain in Chechnya. Though the terrain and forest argument does not necessitate rebels striking in these areas (only using the physical features for protection), violence in this mid-elevation forested zone is characterized by local attacks on villages and police forces.
Modeling Violence using Poisson Mixed Models
To assess the relative importance over time of several key explanatory variables that have we have illustrated in the graphs and tables, we estimated regression models that consider their joint and independent effects. We generated models that predict the number of rebel events in locations by breaking the data series at August 1, 2007, because the last four years -geographic coordinates. We aggregated violence to town/city coordinates, rounded to the nearest 10 kilometers. This rounding prevents nearby adjacent towns from inclusion multiple include the rounded coordinates for all of the towns in the GEOnet Names Server (GNS) from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) for the North Caucasus study area. This yields a total of 1,614 coordinates, for which we extracted values for the explanatory variables discussed above: forest (1 for presence or 0 for absence in the 5 km range), village (present or not), urban or near urban locations (present or not), elevation (in kilometers), and distance to nearest strategic location (kilometers). We also added a distance to Grozny (kilometers) measure as an explicitly spatial control for the disproportionate violence experienced in Grozny (as the rebel capital to 2000) and surroundings. Lastly, we added the local population for each coordinate, obtained from CIESIN's Gridded Population of the World (GPWv3) dataset (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/) for the years 2000 and 2010 at the 2.5 minute spatial resolution to act as a control, because we would expect the number of violent events to be related to the size of the local population. The violent event data count distribution lends itself well to a Poisson regression model; most towns (85 percent) did not experience rebel violence, about 6 percent experienced one event, and the remainder (9 percent) experienced two or more rebel events. Because we expect a strong republic-level effect across the seven political units, we used a generalized linear mixed model to examine differences among the republics. 26 This procedure allowed us to partition the variance into republic-level and local-level effects.
Estimates for the two models (before and after August 1, 2007) are presented in Examining the republic-level variance, the modeling indicates a strong effect-from 34
Kray and the Ossetian-dominated North Ossetia), this outcome is unsurprising and would be highly correlated with the Russian percentage of total population as a predictor in the model. The fact that the effect becomes stronger over time suggests the increasing republic-level -have seen a diminution in violence since the height of the war against the Chechen rebels, 1999-2003.
expected direction. Locations that are urban or close to urban areas, locations close to Grozny, locations close to strategic locations, and higher elevation locations all have higher counts of violence. Locations with larger populations have more violence in the second period, but the reverse effect (smaller places with more violence) is evident in the period to 2007. In the earlier period, the Chechnya-focused war incorporated almost all locations in that republic and in claims of the political scientists of a higher likelihood of rebel activity in forested areas, the -tive effect in the most recent one.
terning, but plotting them by republic (the whisker plots in Fig. 9 ) reveals a strong pattern by the republic's level of overall violence. With the exception of one distribution (that for -cantly from zero (the horizontal dashed line in the plots). The width of the whiskers indicates their mean. Positive values (above the line) show an underprediction of violence (more than expected in these republics after accounting for the distribution by the predictors) and negative values are overpredicted republics. Comparisons of the republics across the two graphs show consistent underprediction for the three most violent regions: for Chechnya (though 2007), and Dagestan (also more violence after 2007 than predicted). Conversely, the less violent regions (Stavropol' Kray, North Ossetia, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia) are overpredicted but Kabardino-Balkaria, which saw the proportionately greatest upsurge in violence, switches from overprediction in the 1999-2007 period to underprediction in the latter period.
CONCLUSIONS
As expected from the journalistic accounts of dramatic instances of rebel attacks, as well as descriptive studies of the republic-by-republic trends, rebel violence since the start of the second Chechen war dispersed to other areas of the Chechen Republic, and later to the adjoining republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. The dramatic reduction in violence in Chechnya after 2004 is not paralleled by similar decreases elsewhere, but instead, taking advantage of local environmental and cultural contexts, the rebellion continues, although at an overall diminished level. The importance of mountainous and forested terrain (as refuges and bases the North Caucasus of Russia. Instead, the rebellion has taken on a more urban character in the republics where it is now most entrenched. Access to important targets (the main highway and major urban centers) remains central in the rebel strategy. Using geographically sensitive multi-level modeling, we have demonstrated that conthe west-Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria-display different trends over the past decade. While the former remained relatively peaceful, the latter has experienced a dramatic upturn in rebel activity associated with the consolidation of a local Islamist mobilization. Attention to these local circumstances and further interest in the causes of these differences is suggested by both our account of the political and security developments in each republic and the (carto)graphic and analytical interpretations that follow. Inasmuch as there is continued interest in developing general models of explanation in civil war study, the disaggregated approach implies, but does not always realize, the full implications of the paradigmatic shift. It must integrate detailed visualization of patterns and trends with in-depth consideration of contextual idiosyncrasies and refrain from a concern with attaining a general model of geographic explanation. Our study of the evolving dynamics of the second Caucasian/Chechen war demonstrates both the complexities of the insurgent process and its resulting spatial patterns.
